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The island of Lampedusa has become the focal point of attempts to address irregular migration in
the Mediterranean, but how does the EU’s border system at Lampedusa actually function?
Giacomo Orsini writes on the nature of the system, noting that it represents a complex combination
of surveillance and detention measures. He argues however that the attention focused on
Lampedusa itself is disproportionate, with the majority of undocumented migration into the EU
taking place via other routes.
Lampedusa constitutes ‘the quintessential embodiment of the Euro-African migration and border
regime’. Yet what precisely happens around this tiny Italian island rarely reaches the public. Mainstream narratives
instead tend to distort public opinion and inﬂame the debate.
While the EU plans its military operation to ‘disrupt human smuggling networks in the Southern Central
Mediterranean’, this article aims to provide some much needed clarity on the present situation, based on my own
direct knowledge of the island. Indeed, by understanding how the border system in Lampedusa actually functions,
and the major interests at stake in running such a costly apparatus – both in terms of the human cost and the
ﬁnancial cost for EU taxpayers – it becomes easier to appreciate the role that Lampedusa plays within the broader
EU external border regime.
The ‘concentric circles’ of the border at Lampedusa
The EU’s external border structures in Lampedusa are complex. With the island at its core, its functions spread over
a vast area, enclosing seawaters over a distance of tens of nautical miles. As such, the border can largely be divided
into two areas: those areas at sea and those on land.
At sea, border operations develop along two major trajectories as migrants’ boats are ﬁrst detected and then
rescued. In terms of the present maritime external border at Lampedusa, the surveillance system relies on
sophisticated electronic devices, large navy ships, drones, helicopters, intelligence staﬀ deployed on the North
African coast, coastguard boats, radar, satellites, soldiers, and law enforcement oﬃcials. However, migrant boats
are also often located by ﬁshermen and other civilians navigating the Sicilian Channel. Frequently migrants call for
rescue and provide their coordinates.
Once boats are detected, the Italian navy and the other European navies operating in the area – mostly within the
frame of Frontex operations – eventually rescue migrants. However, at times migrants have been simply (and
illegally) pushed back to their original departure country. Fishermen and other civilians often take part in these highly
risky operations. In general, all of these actions, from detection to rescuing, take place several miles away from
Lampedusa: once migrants board a rescue boat they are then taken to the island.
On Lampedusa itself, there is the Favarolo quay: a gated dock where migrants are disembarked, including those
that have died, and where medical aid will be delivered to those in need. From there, a bus takes migrants to the
island’s holding centre. This is a constantly overcrowded facility where ‘hosts’ are often detained for months, even
though the law states they should be deported to detention centres in mainland Sicily and the rest of Italy no later
than 96 hours after arrival.
At the centre, if the internal management is the sole responsibility of private actors, numerous law enforcement
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oﬃcials manage security and surveillance. Once detention ends, migrants are deported away from the island.
Although in the past direct ﬂights have transferred migrants back to Libya and Tunisia from Lampedusa’s airport, in
almost all cases migrants, accompanied by an escort of law enforcement oﬃcials, are now taken to mainland Sicily
via the only ferry connecting the island with the rest of Italy.
Overall the border system can be conceived of as a form of ‘concentric circles’ with the aim of slowing down and
steering migration, rather than stopping it completely. The ﬁgure below presents a visual representation of the
system and its border functions as they spread across the island and the sea surrounding it.
Figure: Visual representation of the EU’s external border system at Lampedusa (click to enlarge)
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In addition to this complex border apparatus involving several diﬀerent actors at a multitude of levels – local,
regional, national, European and global – a variety of other stakeholders also converge around Lampedusa, given
its status as one of the most iconic spots in the EU’s external border regime. Several naval and military actors
operate in the area, with geostrategic calculations developing alongside the maintenance of the border regime.
The border system also entails sophisticated radar and surveillance technologies developed by major European –
as well as non-European – defence and security corporations within the scope of an EU funded research project,
the EU Security Research Programme. While the border at sea has become a notable commercial opportunity and a
major geostrategic factor for national governments, the land-based detention system has also attracted the interest
of a diverse range of actors. Private companies, Catholic organisations and cooperatives have all contributed to the
running of the detention centre in exchange for daily fees of 30 to 50 euros per migrant provided by the Ministry of
the Interior. This corresponds to a business that is now estimated to be worth millions of euros per year.
A purposeless and deadly system
Europe’s external border is therefore both a proﬁtable business for many actors, and a deadly obstacle for others.
Yet the precise rationale for the existence of the system and its associated costs remains debatable. The oﬃcial
justiﬁcation cites the capacity to ‘combat more eﬀectively terrorism, illegal immigration and human traﬃcking’; yet
there is an absence of empirical data that conﬁrms any relationship between illegal immigration and terrorism. A
series of practical evaluations have also undermined the prevailing narrative in support of the current system.
Indeed, despite Lampedusa’s centrality in the construction and representation of Europe’s border regime, the island
itself plays only a marginal – if not entirely irrelevant – role in terms of the overall presence of undocumented and
illegal migrants in the EU. As Frontex note, the biggest entry route for those migrants who currently reside illegally in
the EU has been international airports, with most of those having entered in possession of valid travel documents
and a visa that has since expired.
Of those that did cross Europe’s external border without the necessary documentation, only a small proportion of
them have actually entered via the maritime border, and many of them used routes other than the one through
Lampedusa. The rest have traversed land borders. Nevertheless, the island remains top of the list of spending
priorities for Frontex and this disproportionate level of attention becomes even more striking when one considers
that the vast majority of the migrants passing through Lampedusa are genuine refugees.
If this was not enough, then travelling through the countless small-ports scattered along the southern Sicilian coast,
one very quickly realises that migrants not only arrive at Lampedusa. Arrivals in these other ports are not only
frequent, but have been happening for decades. What diﬀers between those landing at other ports and those at
Lampedusa is simply the level of media and political visibility. This underlines what many stakeholders on the ground
already know to be true: that it is simply impossible to patrol such a vast maritime border so long as there remain
countless ways to cross the Sicilian Channel and no technologies available to prevent the practice.
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